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Abstract
I will present results from a novel analysis of complexity definitions. I will argue that the
vast majority of complexity definitions can be interpreted as requiring di↵erent combinations
of di↵erent technical embodiments of five core criteria for complexity: the three dynamical
criteria of the existence of many components, determinism and indeterminism; and the two
phenomenological criteria of regularity and irregularity. Furthermore, I will show that –
while di↵erent complexity definitions require di↵erent and even exclusive combinations of
these criteria – all complexity definitions require contrasting dynamical and phenomenolog-
ical criteria, i.e. determinism in combination with irregularity or indeterminism in combina-
tion with irregularity. Therefore, a contrast between dynamics and phenomenology appears
to constitute the conceptual heart of complexity science. I will then propose that the exis-
tence of such dyanmics-phenomenology contrasts should be used as a minimal definition of
the concept of complexity. Furthermore, I will show that such contrasts constitute a kind
of epistemological emergence.
1 Introduction
Since its inception in the late 1980s, complexity science has evolved into a well-established
and highly popularized area of science (e.g., for a description of the field’s history, Mitchell,
2009). The ascent of the field has been accompanied a number of foundational claims,
ranging from a redefinition of the arrow of time (e.g. Davies, 2003) to the often quoted
slogan ‘more is di↵erent’ by Anderson (1972). Such foundational claims have also generated
much philosophical debate.
Complexity is universally taken to be a property that characterizes a class of dy-
namical systems. However, the question of how this property should be defined, i.e. which
criteria need to be fulfilled for the label ‘complex’ to be bestowed on a system, has remained
unresolved. During the last thirty years, a large number of di↵erent complexity definitions
have been proposed: Lloyd (2001, p. 7) lists forty-two di↵erent definitions of complexity
and considers this collection a ‘non-exhaustive list’. Responses to this di culty in find-
ing an unequivocal definition of the core concept of the field have been di↵erent among
practitioners and philosophers: while complexity scientists have maintained that a single
formal definition is unnecessary and that the labelling of systems as being complex can
often be underdone intuitively (e.g. Gell-Mann, 1995; Gershenson, 2008), philosophers have
been more concerned with identifying which properties are necessary for a system to be
called ‘complex’ (e.g. Zuchowski, 2012; Ladyman et al., 2013). The driving force behind
such philosophical accounts is usually not just the development of a better understanding of
the concept itself but also its demarcation from related concepts like chaos and randomness.
However, even philosophers usually do not aim at deriving a single, authoritative definition
of complexity but rather at the identification of sets of criteria that have been associated
with the label ‘complex’ (Ladyman et al., 2013) or at the derivation of minimal definitions,
which deliberately highlight the lack of agreed upon criteria (Zuchowski, 2012).
In this paper, I will take a novel approach to the investigation of complexity definitions
that – in addition to identify general criteria used in complexity definitions – focuses on
the relationship between these criteria and uses these relationships to derive a minimal
definition of the concept of complexity. Thereby, I will use a tiered analytical framework
(section 1.1, Figure 1) that distinguishes between a general concept, which can be defined
through a minimal definition; di↵erent definitions associated with this concept; criteria that
are used in these definitions; and technical embodiments of these criteria. My results will
be illustrated on three well-known models in complexity science (section 2): the CA110
(section 2.1); the Bak-Sneppen model (section 2.2); and the logistic equation (section 2.3).
My analysis can be visualised roughly as an ascent through the di↵erent tiers of the
analytical framework. Firstly, in section 3, I will argue that the vast majority of complexity
definitions can be viewed as requiring di↵erent combinations of di↵erent technical embod-
iments of five core criteria for the diagnosis of complexity: the three dynamical criteria of
the existence of many components (section 3.1.1), determinism (section 3.1.2) and indeter-
minism (section 3.1.3); and the two phenomenological criteria of regularity (section 3.2.1)
and irregularity (section 3.2.2).
Secondly, in section 4, I will then use my identification of the criteria for the diagnosis
of complexity to analyse three di↵erent complexity definition, each of which can be seen as
indicative of a class of similar definitions. In particular, I will show that the determinism-
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based definition of complexity by Wolfram (1984, 2002) requires fulfilment of the criteria of
determinism, regularity and irregularity (section 4.1); that the indeterminism-based defini-
tion by Ladyman et al. (2013) requires fulfilment of the criteria of the existence of many
components, indeterminism and regularity (section 4.2); that the inclusive definition by
Goldenfeld and Kadano↵ (1999) requires fulfilment either of the criteria of determinism
and irregularity or of indeterminism and regularity (section 4). My analysis enables a de-
tailed comparison of these definitions and it will become apparent that the determinism-
and indeterminism-based definition are exclusive of one another, i.e. there is no overlap
between their extensions. In contrast, the extension of the inclusive definition includes the
extensions of both other definitions. Furthermore, I will show that the determinism- and
indeterminism based definitions both exclude chaotic systems while the inclusive definitions
allows these systems to be additionally classified as complex. This will also be borne out by
an application of these definitions to the three case studies.
Thirdly, in section 5, I will use the results from my analysis of di↵erent complexity
definitions to provide a minimal definition of complexity, i.e. to provide a description of the
concept of complexity that underlies all of these definitions. The minimal definition will
be based on a property shared by all analysed definitions: they all require combinations of
contrasting dynamical and phenomenological criteria. In particular, all definitions require
either the dynamical criterion of determinism in conjunction with the phenomenological
criterion of irregularity or the dynamical criterion of indeterminism in conjunction with the
phenomenological criterion of regularity. Furthermore, I will show that two of the most
prevalent metaphorical descriptors of complexity, ‘being between order and chaos’ and ‘self-
organisation’ can also be interpreted as encapsulations of specific dynamics-phenomenology
contrasts, namely the one specific to the determinism- and the indeterminism-based defi-
nition, respectively. Accordingly, I will propose that the concept of complexity should be
(minimally) defined as the existence of dynamics-phenomenology contrasts. Additionally, I
will show that the dynamics-phenomenology contrast that is reflected in the definitions and
descriptors can be viewed as a specific kind of epistemological emergence (section 5.2).
The realisation that it is this contrast between (deterministic/indeterministic) dynam-
ics and (regular/irregular) phenomenologies that is articulated in all complexity definitions
and the major metaphorical descriptors of the field, and therefore forms the conceptual heart
of complexity science, constitutes the main result of my analysis. In light of this result, the
coexistence of many di↵erent complexity definitions can be viewed as providing a means
of identifying this core concept in di↵erent classes of systems. While the relative merits of
di↵erent definitions can still be argued, their coexistence should therefore not be seen as
a sign of deep conceptual divisions but as a means of highlighting one shared concept, i.e.
the existence of a contrast between dynamics and phenomenology, in many di↵erent mod-
els. Accordingly, my analysis also o↵ers a way to demarcate the field of complexity science
itself: namely, as the field of science concerned with the study of systems that display such
contrasts between their dynamics and phenomenologies. Since the concept of complexity
can be interpreted as a kind of epistemological emergence, this also implies that emergence
is indeed part of the foundations of complexity science.
In addition to those conceptual results about the foundations of complexity science,
my analysis also leads to the clarification of a number of concepts, definitions and metaphors
in complexity science. It therefore results in a clear exhibition of the epistemic structure
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Figure 1: Relationships between concepts, definitions, criteria and embodiments (abbrevi-
ated as E). The total number of definitions, criteria and embodiments are denoted by N , K
and L, respectively.
of the field, i.e. it allows for a conceptual sharpening of terminology and reveals the rela-
tionships of di↵erent terms with each other. Accordingly, I hope that my work here also
contributes to the terminological tidying of complexity science that has been requested by
several authors (e.g. Horgan, 1995; Frigg, 2003). However, since this analysis is an exercise
in rational reconstruction, I do not claim that it is the only viable interpretation – nor that
it always captures the initially intended meaning of a concept in all historically relevant
nuances – or that the analytic framework I use is the only possible one for the analysis of
scientific definitions. Instead, I hope that merits of my conceptual reconstructions will be
evident in the clarity with which they expose the concept underlying di↵erent complexity
definitions and the relationships these definitions have with each other.
In the following two subsections, I will briefly review the frameworks and concepts
on which my analysis in sections 3 – 5 will be based: the tiered framework for the analysis
of definitions (section 1.1); and the concept of emergence, which – relative to the wealth of
material available on this topic – will only be reviewed very briefly (section 1.2).
1.1 Concepts, Definitions, Criteria and Embodiments
The coexistence of many di↵erent definitions of a core concept is not unique to complexity
science: similar constellations can be found for a large variety of terms, e.g. ‘partnering’
(Nystroem, 2005); ‘sensitivity’ (Mencattini and Mari, 2015); ‘synergy’ (Berthoud, 2013) and
‘chaos’ (Zuchowski, 2017). The conceptual frameworks used to analyse the relationships be-
tween the overarching concept and the di↵erent definitions are usually based on a further
decomposition of the latter into di↵erent ‘components’ (e.g. Nystroem, 2005) or ‘criteria’
(e.g Zuchowski, 2017). I will adopt the latter nomenclature. In a third level of analysis,
the criteria required by a given definition can be further decomposed into technical embod-
iments, i.e. formal specifications of a given criterion that allow a quantitative measurement
in a given set of scenarios (Mencattini and Mari, 2015; Zuchowski, 2017, e.g.). From such
3
a compositional analysis of a concept into separate definitions, criteria and embodiments,
conclusions about this concept can be drawn. For example, Nystroem (2005) concludes
that all definitions of ‘partnering’ require the criteria of ‘trust’ and ‘mutual understanding’,
thereby rendering these two properties the minimal conditions for a scenario to be given
this label.
In this paper, I will adopt a similar four-tier framework for the compositional analysis
of the concept of ‘complexity’. The four tiers of the framework - general concept, definitions,
criteria and embodiments - are displayed in Figure 1. This compositional analysis will allow
me to identify a feature characteristic of all of these definitions: despite the fact that the
combinations of criteria used in these definitions may vary, all definitions implicitly postulate
a contrast between the dynamical and phenomenological criteria required (section 5). I will
the propose that this contrast should be seen as characteristic of the concept of complexity
and could be used for a minimal definition of this concept. In the following, I will briefly
describe each component of the framework; however, none of the terms is used with radically
di↵erent meaning than that colloquially assigned to it.
Concepts The term ‘concept’ is used to denote the overarching notion that underlies
all (or most) of the definitions in question. It is not guaranteed that each compositional
analysis in the style of the one displayed in Figure 1 will reveal an underlying concept: for
example, Berthoud (2013) comes to the conclusion that the disparaging definitions associ-
ated with the term ‘synergy’ (in medicine) are to dissimilar to clearly identify a concept
behind them and advocates that the meaning of the label should be fixed by one statistical
definition. However, in other cases, e.g. for the terms ‘partnering’ (Nystroem, 2005) or
‘chaos’ (Zuchowski, 2017), the analysis of a set of definitions associated with these terms
reveals enough similarities that the definition of an overall concept is warranted. There is
an obvious linguistic pitfall here in the use of the terms ‘define’ and ‘definition’: while it
is used in this framework to denote more specific descriptions of the general concept, it is
also possible to ‘define’ this very concept, i.e. to provide a clear statement of the notion
associated of a label like ‘chaos’ or ‘complexity’. In order to avoid confusion, I will refer to
such a statement as the minimal definition of a concept, i.e. a definition that is in some way
reflected by all separated definitions associated with the concept.
Definitions In this framework, the term ‘definition’ is used in its most common meaning,
i.e. to denote a statement that specifies a set of criteria, which need to be fulfilled by a
given system to receive the concept label in question.
Criteria The term ‘criteria’ is used to denote properties that a system needs to have in
order for this system to be given a particular concept label. They are therefore necessary
conditions for the diagnosis of the conjunctive property corresponding to the label. This
implies that definitions are viewed as bi-conditional relations: i.e. if the required properties
are present, then the system will receive the label specified by the definition and if a system
carries a certain label, then all properties specified in this definition will be fulfilled. Criteria
are therefore necessary conditions for the diagnosis of the concept property as defined in
this specific definition.
The medically inspired terms of ‘criteria’ and ‘diagnosis’ rather than ‘conditions’
have been deliberately chosen: it facilitates the drawing of a clear distinction between
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the classification of a system and the identification of conditions under which the system
will likely be classified as such, i.e. between the definition of concept as a set of required
properties and the necessary and su cient conditions for a display of these properties.
This does not mean that these two sets of conditions cannot overlap, i.e. that necessary
conditions used as criteria cannot also be viewed as necessary or su cient conditions for
the occurrence of the labelled behaviour. However, Sua´rez (2013) and Zuchowski (2017)
argue (convincingly, in my opinion) that scientists’ discourse shows a general distinction
between necessary conditions used in definitions (i.e. criteria) and su cient conditions for
the occurrence of the behaviour thus defined. It should also be noted that Ladyman et al.
(2013) appear to pursue a similar strategy and only include those conditions they consider
necessary for complexity into their eventual complexity definition (section 4.2).
It will be useful for my analysis to adopt another distinction introduced by Zuchowski
(2017, Chapter 3): that between ‘phenomenological’ and ‘dynamical’ criteria. The designa-
tion ‘dynamical’ thereby refers to properties of the underlying mechanisms of a system, e.g.
the formalism of a model, while the designator ‘phenomenological’ refers to those properties
of a system’s behaviour that are observable without any knowledge about these underlying
mechanisms, e.g. the output of a model. At first glance, one might assume that dynamical
properties should always be viewed as su cient or necessary conditions for the occurrence of
a certain behaviour rather than as criteria for its diagnosis. However, However, Zuchowski
(2017, Chapter 3) shows that a closer analysis of existing chaos definitions reveals that the
label ‘chaotic’ will only be given to a system if the dynamical criterion of determinism is also
fulfilled. In some chaos definitions, this particular criterion is crucial to distinguishing the
concept from other, related concepts: in particular, in the definition of stochastic chaos. The
definition of stochastic chaos requires phenomenological indistinguishability from systems
whose underlying mechanisms are Bernoulli processes, i.e. from truly stochastic systems.
In this definition, the dynamical property of determinism is therefore used as a criterion for
the diagnosis of chaos rather than postulated as a su cient or necessary condition for its
occurrence. In section 3, I will show that there are several dynamical criteria for complexity
and that these play a similar demarcating role as the one identified by (Zuchowski, 2017,
Chapter 3).
Embodiments Since the quantitative measurement of complexity is not one of my main
concerns in this paper, the fourth step in the compositional analysis, i.e. the analysis into
di↵erent ‘embodiments’ will not be pursued in detail. The term ‘embodiment’ thereby de-
notes a statement that specifies a criterion in technical detail, usually so that a quantitative
measurement of the property can be performed in a given class of scenarios. While the
specification of di↵erent embodiments for a given criterion will not be a main focus point of
this paper, Zuchowski (2017) and Mencattini and Mari (2015) have found that the existence
of di↵erent embodiments of a criterion adds further variability to the number of definition
for a given concept: in addition of requiring di↵erent combinations of criteria, definitions
of a concept can also di↵er by requiring the same combination of criteria but in di↵erent
technical embodiments.
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1.2 A (very brief) note on emergence
The concept of emergence was initially developed within the tradition of the logical analysis
of scientific theories. Accordingly, it was coupled with the notion that scientific theories
and explanations can be analysed in formal, logical and linguistic terms. In particular,
Hempel and Oppenheim (1948, p. 138) describe explanation as the logical deduction of
the description of an empirical phenomenon (the explanandum) from antecedent conditions
and general laws (the explanans). Emergence is then a conceptualisation of the failure to
derive an explanandum from the salient explanans, typically describing the spatial, even
microscopic, constituents of the system (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948, p.147):
Generally speaking, the concept of emergence has been used to characterise
certain phenomena as “novel”, and this not merely in the psychological sense
of being unexpected, but in the theoretical sense of being unexplainable, or
unpredictable, on the basis of information concerning the spatial parts or other
constituents of the system in which the phenomena occur [...].
Much of the more recent discussion of emergence has taken place outside the for-
malised, unified framework for science aspired to in these early analyses (e.g., for review,
Bedau and Humphreys, 2008). Instead of being derived from a logical analysis of theories,
recent notions of emergence have mostly been constructed from catalogues of defining in-
stances. Hempel’s and Oppenheim’s (1948) original desire to raise the notion beyond that
of the psychologically puzzling is thereby not always upheld: Ronald and Sipper (2001,
p. 20) propose that a feeling of surprise should be the central element of an “emergence
test”. Butterfield (2011, p. 922) pointed out that, unsurprisingly, notions of emergence
constructed from di↵erent catalogues of defining instances will be widely di↵erent.
However, for the purpose of this study, a particular reading of the definition as de-
vised by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948, p.147) will su ce: I will use the term emergence to
describe the existence of features in the phenomenology of a system, which could not have
straightforwardly been predicted from knowledge about the essential properties of the sys-
tem’s dynamics. While this rephrasing of the definition emphasises the conceptual division
between the dynamics and the phenomenology of a system and thereby renders the concept
easily combinable with the framework for the analysis of complexity definitions introduced
in section 1.1, it is also general enough to be compatible with the majority of conceptu-
alisations of emergence in complex system (e.g. Gregersen, 2003; Bedau and Humphreys,
2008).
The notion of emergence described here is clearly an epistemological one (e.g. Silber-
stein and McGeever, 1999; Cunningham, 2001): it is fundamentally an assessment of the
predictiveness of knowledge about a certain part of a system (i.e. its dynamics) with re-
spect to another part of the system (i.e. its phenomenology). While the distinction between
epistemological and ontological emergence has been notoriously di cult to define (e.g. Sil-
berstein and McGeever, 1999; Butterfield, 2011), I maintain that the type of emergence seen
in the systems usually discussed in complexity science (e.g. the three case studies introduced
in section 2) cannot be ontological in the sense that is hypothesised to underlie emergence
in systems that are usually cited as examples for the latter kind of emergence. In particular,
the kind of emergence seen in complex systems does not appear to involve the hypothesised
changes in the dynamics of the system that have been labelled as ontologically emergent (i.e.
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the change from non-probabilistic to probabilistic dynamics at the quantum boundary). In
contrast, it is obvious in the systems discussed in section 2 that the any emergent features -
however novel and useful they are - can in principle be reduced to a definite set of dynamics.
The notion of epistemological emergence inherently contains an element of observer-
dependency: any assessment of predictiveness will always be relative to the predictive power
of the individual performing the prediction. However, this observer-dependency is usually
treated as philosophically unproblematic: the hypothetical observer is assumed to be the
‘best possible’ one, e.g. in most scenarios, a competent expert who can reasonably be
expected to possess maximum predictive powers with respect to the given information.
Similarly, I will take the notion of ‘prediction’ in the definition of emergence tendered here
to mean ‘prediction’ by a competent, human expert.
However, even with this grounding of prediction, the notion of emergence I work
with in this paper – and that I will eventually ascribe to complex systems as they are
prevalently defined (section 5) – is clearly a ‘weak’ one. In fact, it is even less demanding
then the notion of emergence for which Bedau (2008) has coined the label ‘weak’ since
his notion additionally requires the possibility of ascribing causal powers to the emergent
features. However, this does not necessarily render this notion of emergence an uninteresting
one. Firstly, in section 5.2, I will argue that it correctly captures a true physical feature
of the class of systems usually described as complex; if this feature is less ‘spectacular’
than anticipated, then this is valuable information in itself. Secondly, the fact that there
are systems whose behaviour is not straightforwardly predictable from its dynamics is not
without conceptual interest and its realisation could inspire new investigative approaches
– as requested by a number of complexity scientists (e.g. Wolfram, 2002; Kau↵man, 2008;
Mitchell, 2009).
2 Case studies: complex and chaotic systems
In this section, I will briefly describe three seminal models that will be used to illustrate both
the criteria required by di↵erent complexity definitions (section 3) as well as the di↵erences
in their extensions (section 4).
The three models discussed here are both relatively simple as well as generally well
known. Accordingly, my own descriptions of their dynamics and their phenomenologies will
be kept as brief as possible. The reliance on such simple models in the discussion of com-
plexity definitions has been criticized, e.g. Morowitz (2002) and Fromm (2004) argue that
‘true’ complexity cannot be found in such simple models and that the focus of the discussion
should shift to more realistic representations of the ‘complicated’ systems found in nature.
However, the vast majority of the practitioners (e.g. Holland, 1998; Bak and Sneppen, 1993)
and philosophers (e.g. Bedau and Humphreys, 2008; Hooker, 2011) discussing complexity
definitions still rely heavily on these models and this is certainly the case for the body of
literature I am directly engaging with in this paper (Goldenfeld and Kadano↵, 1999; Wol-
fram, 2002; Ladyman et al., 2013). Accordingly, the choice of these models as illustrations
of the criteria used in these definitions and of the concept that I claim underlies all of these
definitions is justified by the immediate methodological context of the discussion. This does
not preclude an extension of this discussion to more ‘complicated’, realistic systems in the
future, of course.
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Figure 2: Phenomenology of the deterministic cellular automaton with two-valued, nearest-
neighbours rule set 110. The model was initiated with a single black cell in the middle of
the domain and has periodic boundary conditions.
The three models described here are: the CA110, which is a deterministic cellular
automaton (section 2.1); the Bak-Sneppen model, which is an indeterministic cellular au-
tomaton (section 2.2); and the logistic equation, which is a chaotic mapping (section 2.3). I
have chosen these particular models as case studies as each one has been used as an exemplar
for a di↵erent definition of complexity: they can therefore be seen as providing the clearest
examples for the combination of criteria required by each of the definitions discussed in
section 4. Accordingly, they also serve to highlight the contrasts between the extensions of
di↵erent complexity definitions.
2.1 Deterministic cellular automaton: CA110
The CA110 is a one-dimensional, nearest-neighbours cellular automaton, i.e. it consists of a
grid (strip) of N cells, which can assume one of two colour states, ’black’ and ‘white’. The
colour of a cell at position i is determined by the colours of itself and its two neighbouring
cells at position i 1 and i+1. For two colour states, there are eight di↵erent combinations
that these three cells can assume. The rule-set of the CA110 therefore comprises eight rules
of how the cell i is to respond to each of these combinations: e.g. if both cells i  1, i and
i  1 are black at time step t, then cell i will become white at time step t+1; if cell i  1 is
white and cells i and i+1 are black at time step t, then cell i will remain black at time step
t + 1; and so on. The CA110 has been studied extensively by several authors; a complete
description of its rule set can be found in e.g. Wolfram (2002). For the purposes of this
paper, it is only important to note that the dynamics of the CA110 are fully deterministic:
provided the specification of appropriate boundary conditions, the states of all N cells at
time step t+ 1 is uniquely determined by the states of these cells at time step t.
Figure 2 shows the phenomenology of a CA110 with N = 100, periodic boundary
conditions and an initial state of just one black cell at i = 50. It is immediately obvious
that the phenomenology of the CA110 – if represented on a two-dimensional space-time
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Figure 3: Phenomenology of the indeterministic Bak-Sneppen model. The model was ini-
tiated with a single black cell in the middle of the domain and has periodic boundary
conditions.
plot (i.e. a representation in which color changes on the strip are shown as two-dimensional
stationary patterns) – is dominated by local pattering of triangular areas of di↵erent sizes.
It is notable that areas in the space-time diagram dominated by collections of triangles of a
given size roughly indicate areas on the ring which change colour with a given periodicity.
Accordingly, the space-time diagram could also be read as an indication that the behaviour of
the CA110 is dominated by both areas that change colour without a determinable frequency,
i.e. flicker randomly, and areas in which a dominated frequency can be identified.
2.2 Indeterministic cellular automaton: Bak-Sneppen model
The set-up for the (discrete) Bak-Sneppen model is very similar to that of the CA110: a
one-dimensional, nearest-neighbours cellular automaton with two colour states. However, in
contrast to the CA110, the dynamics of the Bak-Sneppen model are probabilistic. During
each time-step t, a cell i is chosen randomly. If this cell i is currently white, then its
colour value and that of its two nearest-neighbours at sites i  1 and i+ 1 will be replaced
by randomly chosen colour values, i.e. there is an equal probability of p = 0.5 that each
of these cells will be black or white at time step t + 1. If the cell i is black, then no
changes are made to the automaton. It is immediately obvious that the dynamics of the
Bak-Sneppen model are not deterministic: the state of the automaton at time t does not
uniquely determine the state of the automaton at t+ 1.
Figure 3 shows the phenomenology of a Bak-Sneppen model with N = 100, periodic
boundary conditions and an initial state of just one black cell at i = 50. While the original
version of the model uses a continuous colour spectrum (Bak and Sneppen, 1993), it has
been determined that the phenomenology of the discrete model is similar to that of the
continuous one in all essential aspects (Meester and Znamenski, 2002). As apparent in
Figure 3, the behaviour of the model is characterised by periods of quiescent behaviour,
which is punctuated by shorter and longer periods of rapid, localised change. For longer
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Figure 4: Phenomenology of the logistic equation. The model was initialized with x0 = 0.5.
runs of the model, it can be shown that, under many conditions, the spatial size of these
‘catastrophic events’ or ‘avalanches’ and the frequency with which thus events appears are
approximately related by a power-law (e.g. Bak and Sneppen, 1993; Meester and Znamenski,
2002), i.e. small events of rapid change occur exponentially more often than large events of
rapid change.
2.3 Chaotic mapping: the logistic equation
The logistic equation is a well-known discrete mapping, which has served as a paradigm
case for certain definitions of chaos (e.g. May, 1974; Smith, 1998; Zuchowski, 2017). The
mapping is non-linear and consists of the following equation:
xt+1 = xt (1 + r (1  xt)) , (1)
where r is a fixed parameter that is usually called the growth rate. The function is fully
deterministic: given a value xt, it uniquely specifies a value for xt+1. However, in contrast
to the cellular automata discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the logistic function consists of a
sequence of single-points and its space-time diagram is therefore a one-dimensional sequence
of points.
The behaviour of the mapping varies for di↵erent values of r. In the chaotic regime,
which happens for values of 2.57 < r < 3, the function shows an aperiodic phenomenology,
i.e. the sequence of points ... xt 1, xt, xt+1 ... appears to be random (Figure 4). Fur-
thermore, in this regime, the function displays sensitive dependence to initial conditions
(SDIC): small changes in the initial (or any intermediate value) of x usually lead to large
di↵erence in the further development of the sequence. These properties of the logistic equa-
tion, which lead to a phenomenology that is in significant aspects indistinguishable from the
phenomenology of a truly random, i.e. probabilistic, process, have been traced back to the
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fact that the logistic equation can be expressed in terms of the shift function (e.g. Tsonis,
1992).
3 Dynamical and phenomenological criteria for com-
plexity
In this section, I will identify and discuss the dynamical and phenomenological criteria
(section 1.1) used in the majority of complexity definitions. Several authors (e.g. Ladyman
et al., 2013; Hooker, 2011) have provided lists of conditions for complexity. These lists are
often relatively long and do not always distinguish between (i) criteria for the diagnosis
of complexity and conditions for its occurrence; and (ii) concepts, definitions, criteria and
technical embodiments (as introduced in section 1.1). I will therefore build upon these
existing works by showing that these longer lists of conditions can be distilled into five
criteria for complexity (some of which have di↵erent technical embodiments).
Three of these criteria are dynamical criteria (section 3.1): the existence of many com-
ponents (section 3.1.1); determinism (section 3.1.2); and indeterminism (section 3.1.3). In
addition, there are two phenomenological criteria (section 3.2): regularity (3.2.2) and irreg-
ularity (section 3.2.1). The most prevalent embodiments of each criterion will be discussed
in the relevant sections.
3.1 Dynamical criteria
In this section, I will discuss the dynamical criteria used in complexity definitions. As de-
fined in section 1.1, dynamical criteria are criteria that refer to properties of the underlying
mechanisms of a system, e.g. to the formalism of a model. Deciding whether a given sys-
tem fulfils these criteria therefore requires knowledge about the dynamics of the system.
This does not exclude the possibility of inferring these dynamical properties from the phe-
nomenology of a system: in fact, for natural systems, this is often necessary and might
require additional diagnostic techniques (e.g., on the use of such techniques in chaos theory,
Zuchowski, 2017, Chapter 4). In contrast, the equations of models are usually known and
their fulfilment of any dynamical criteria can then be directly determined.
3.1.1 The existence of many components
Many complexity definitions require the existence of many components as a dynamical
criterion for complexity (Zuchowski, 2012, p. 212; Ladyman et al., 2013, p. 35; p. 57). As
Zuchowski (2012, p. 212) points out, the criterion of the existence of many components is
su cient to distinguish complex systems from virtually all chaotic systems: chaos definitions
are virtually exclusively defined for maps, i.e. for systems with few degrees of freedom (e.g.
Devaney, 1989; Hilborn, 2002). Accordingly, definitions that do not require the existence of
many components as a criterion for the diagnosis of complexity are usually associated with
relatively expansive accounts of the scope of complexity science and include chaos theory as
one of its subfields (e.g. Casti, 1992a,b; Hooker, 2011).
The demarcating power of this criterion is also obvious when applied to our set of
case studies: both the Bak-Sneppen model (section 2.2) and the CA110 (section 2.1) are
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many-component models and hence fulfil this criterion; in contrast, the logistic equation
(section 2.3) is a one-dimensional mapping and therefore does not.
3.1.2 Determinism
Determinism (as a property label) usually refers to the fact that the equations comprising
the canonical description of the dynamics of a given system admit a unique development for
each initial (or intermittent) value and therefore do not contain any probabilistic terms.
The use of the concept of determinism in complexity science is characterised by an
idiosyncratic feature: it is usually the second aspect of my definition above, i.e. the absence
of any probabilistic terms, that is stressed. This emphasis is evident in the labelling of a
prominent class of models capable of being complex: cellular automata (CAs), which are one
of the paradigmatic classes of models in complexity science, are usually categorised as being
‘probabilistic’ or ‘non-probabilistic’ (e.g. Wolfram, 2002; Batty, 2005). Non-probabilistic
CAs – like the CA110 (section 2.1) – do not have any probabilistic terms in their rule
sets; while probabilistic CAs – like the Bak-Sneppen model (section 2.2) have rule sets with
probabilistic terms. An identical categorisation is used for two other prevalent classes of
models in complexity science: network and agent-based models. A consequence of this focus
on the presence or absence of probabilistic dynamics is the fact that, if a system’s underlying
processes or formalisms are known, then one can straightforwardly determine whether it is
deterministic or not.
3.1.3 Indeterminism
Indeterminism as a dynamical criterion can be defined as a complement to the criterion of
determinism: i.e. as the fact that the equations of the canonical description of the dynamics
of a system admit more than one development for a given initial (intermittent) value.
Phrased in terms of the presence of probabilistic and non-probabilistic terms, the
criterion of indeterminism requires that at least some probabilistic terms are present in the
system’s dynamics. The criterion of determinism (section 3.1.2) and that of indeterminism
are therefore mutually exclusive of each other, i.e. no system can fulfil both criteria simulta-
neously. In our set of case studies, the Bak-Sneppen model is indeterministic (section 2.2),
while the CA110 (section 2.1) and the logistic equation (section 2.3) are deterministic.
Several of the complexity definitions listed by Ladyman et al. (2013, p. 36) require
indeterminism as a criterion for the diagnosis of complexity. This is sometimes phrased as a
requirement of ‘multiple causal pathways’ or ‘multiple conditional pathways’, which appears
to be a rephrasing of the admittance of multiple solutions for a given initial value, i.e. of
the defining feature of indeterminism. Indeterminism as a criterion for complexity is not
identical with a requirement of stochasticity, i.e. the requirement that the dynamics of a
system can be represented as a Bernoulli process. Rather, even authors using the descriptor
‘disordered’ to describe the dynamics of complex systems (e.g. Ladyman et al., 2013, p. 41),
e↵ectively only require the presence any probabilistic terms (independent of their underlying
algebra and distribution) for a system’s dynamics to be counted as such.
While therefore none of the prevalent complexity definitions seems to require stochas-
ticity, the requirement of even some indeterministic terms is su cient, of course, to ensure
that the dynamics of such systems do not comply with the definition of determinism. Ac-
cordingly, requiring indeterminism as a dynamical criterion for complexity implies that many
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models that have traditionally been viewed as complex can no longer be given that label:
namely, deterministic CAs (including the CA110 discussed in section 2.1) and determinis-
tic networks (which constitute the foci of many seminal works in complexity science, e.g.
Wolfram, 2002).
3.2 Phenomenological criteria
Distinguishing between phenomenological and dynamical criteria in complexity definitions is
particularly di cult since these definitions often contain terms that appear to be describing
dynamical features of a system (e.g. ‘memory’, ‘hierarchy’ etc) but are actually used to
denote phenomenological properties. e recall: phenomenological features and criteria are
properties of a system’s behaviour; they can be identified without knowledge of a natural
system’s underlying processes or of a model’s equations. The use of such pseudo-dynamical
terminology appears to be a consequence of a particular approach to the analysis of these
models that is based on the proposition of hypothetical ‘alternative dynamics’, i.e. dynamics,
which are known not to be the real processes governing a system, but that would be able to
reproduce certain aspects of this system’s behaviour.
It is notable that this approach is not based on the claim that the alternative dynam-
ics are equally likely candidates for the ‘true’ dynamics of the system. Rather it assumes
that actual dynamics are known and treats the fact that the phenomenology could (hypo-
thetically) be caused by the chosen alternative dynamics as a phenomenological property.
This is very apparent in discussions of the logistic equation (section 2.3): its phenomenology
(Figure 4) is often described as being indistinguishable from that of a Bernoulli process (e.g.
May, 1974; Lorenz, 1993). However, both from its grounding in population dynamics (May,
1974) and its actual formalism (1), it is apparent that the model is deterministic and there-
fore fundamentally di↵erent from a Bernoulli process. However, the fact that this di↵erence
cannot trivially be derived from its phenomenology is seen as an important feature: Lorenz
(1993) even proposes to use indistinguishability from a probabilistic process as definition of
chaos.
I maintain that it is important to distinguish between phenomenology and dynamics
and to therefore look beyond any possibly misleading terminology for two reasons: firstly,
in sections 3.2.1 and section 3.2.2, it will become apparent that the large number of dif-
ferent concepts used as phenomenological criteria for complexity can actually be seen as
di↵erent embodiments of just two such criteria, regularity and irregularity; secondly, a clear
categorisation of criteria as dynamical or phenomenological will reveal that most complexity
definitions are based on the requirement of the existence of a contrast between the dynamics
and the phenomenology of a system. In section 5, I will argue that this fact can be used to
derive a minimal definition of the concept (section 1.1) of complexity.
3.2.1 Regularity
I will subsume under the criterion of regularity all requirements that the behaviour of a
system shows some form of identifiable patterning. In keeping with the embodiments of
this criterion required by complexity definitions, I therefore define regularity (as a property
label) more loosely than might be done in other contexts and will not require that specific
frequencies, i.e. spatial or temporal intervals for the repetition of a phenomenological fea-
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ture, must be identified for a system to be (phenomenologically) regular. However, for some
embodiments of the criterion of regularity in complexity science, even such a strong version
of the criterion would be fulfilled.
In complexity definitions, regularity is usually required to exists in some parts of
system’s phenomenology only, i.e. most complexity definitions do not require that a system
displays fully periodic or regular behaviour. As a matter of fact, many complexity definitions
explicitly require that the phenomenology of the system is regular in some parts and irregular
in others (Ladyman et al., 2013, p. 12; section 4.1). Therefore, the phenomenological criteria
of regularity and irregularity (section 3.2.2) are not exclusive of one another.
Embodiments of regularity The most frequently used embodiment of the criterion
of regularity is the requirement that distinct patterns can be identified in the system’s
phenomenology (e.g. Ladyman et al., 2013, p. 12). The term thereby refers to a visually
identifiable pattern in some representation of the system’s behaviour: in system’s that have
multiple spatial dimensions, such patterns are usually distinct static or dynamical spatial
structures (e.g. Gliders in the Game of Life); in one-dimensional system’s such patterns are
usually identified as static structures in spatial-temporal plots (e.g. the Sierpinski triangle
in the CA30. In the CA110 (section 2.1, Figure 2) one can identify local areas in which
triangular structures appear to be regularly stacked upon each other. What counts as a
pattern is not always explicitly defined; however, it is usually assumed that such structures
can reliably be identified through visual inspection (e.g. Wolfram, 2002).
A numerical embodiment of the criterion of regularity is that of pattern entropy.
Pattern entropy measures count the number of patterns in a suitable representation of a
model’s phenomenology. Examples of pattern entropies are block entropy (Wolfram, 2002)
and statistical complexity (Feldman and Crutchfield, 1998). Pattern entropies are highest
for systems whose behaviours that show many di↵erent periodicities, e.g. for superpositions
of oscillations with di↵erent frequencies or amplitudes. These numerical embodiments of
regularity are therefore usually more demanding than a simple identification of patterns.
A further embodiment of the criterion of regularity is the requirement of the existence
of macrolaws. Holland (1998, p. 27) describes this embodiment in the following way:
Persistent patterns often satisfy macrolaws. When a macrolaw can be formu-
lated, the behaviour of the whole pattern can be described without recourse to
the microlaws [...]. Macrolaws are typically simple relative to the behavioural
details of the component elements. The law describing the behaviour of the
glider in in Conway’s model universe is a clear example.
Macrolaws are essentially descriptions of persistent patterns in a system’s phenomenology.
However, this embodiment of the criterion of regularity is su ciently broad that it can
include regularities that are not immediately recognisable as visual patterns in a space-time
diagram, e.g. the power-laws linking the size and frequency of certain extreme features in
the Bak-Sneppen model (section 2.2, Figure 3).
Another embodiment of the criterion of regularity is the requirement of the existence
of regular structures on several scales, which is often phrased as a requirement of the ex-
istence of a structural hierarchy (e.g. Ladyman et al., 2013, p. 12; p. 41). Ladyman
et al. (2013, p. 41) describe the existence of hierarchical patterns in the phenomenology of
a complex system in the following way:
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... [A]n entity that is organised into a variety of levels of structure that interact
with the level above and below and exhibit lawlike and causal regularities, and
various kinds of symmetry, order and periodic behaviour.
This embodiment can therefore be regarded as more demanding than that of the existence of
patterns or of macrolaws: it requires not only that such patterns and macrolaws are present
in a system’s behaviour but that they are present on several di↵erent scales. Furthermore,
the relationships between some of these structures need to be regular, i.e. governed by
macrolaws, as well.
The best known (and likely clearest) example of a model fulfilling this embodiment
of the criterion is the Game of Life: started from a random initial distribution of values,
the model’s phenomenology usually contains some areas, in which its behaviour can best be
described on the level of single grid cells, and some areas, in which patterns spanning three
to five grid cells (e.g. gliders, boats etc) can be identified. Larger patterns involving more
than 10 cells do not spontaneously arise but can be implemented into the CA through an
intentional choice of its initial state (e.g. glider guns; space ships). Furthermore, macrolaws
can also be formulated for the relationships between di↵erent patterns: e.g. gliders will
periodically be created next to an (isolated) glider gun.
Requiring the existence of a structural hierarchy is a demanding embodiment of the
criterion of regularity. Cellular automata, for example, which traditionally form a paradig-
matic class of complex models spontaneously display only non-statical (and therefore po-
tentially ‘interacting’) patterns on two scales: areas that are dominated by single-grid scale
dynamics; and patterns at a larger scale involving three to five cells (e.g. the Game of Life).
The appearance of robust larger structures usually requires the careful choosing of initial
conditions. One-dimensional CAs appear to often display fluctuations on several scales.
These fluctuations manifest as static, often triangular structures in spatial-temporal repre-
sentations of the models’ phenomenologies, which cam involve a large number of di↵erent
spatial scales (e.g. the di↵erently patterned areas of the CA110’s phenomenology, Figure
2). However, since these are one-dimensional structures it is not obvious to me that the
coexistence of these fluctuations should be described as ‘interactions’ in the same way that
more complicated patterns can interact (e.g. gliders and other patterns in the Game of Life).
In actual formulation (e.g. see quotation above), the number of di↵erent scales on which
patterns need to be generated to constitute a hierarchy is often not specified. Accordingly,
there seems to be no formal objection to counting systems which develop features on just
two scales as fulfilling the criterion.
The terminology of ‘macrolaws’ and ‘structural hierarchy’ used to describe and label
these embodiments of the criterion of regularity illustrates the use of pseudo-dynamical lan-
guage and the construction of alternative dynamics. In particular, the notion of macrolaws
seems to imply the construal of an alternative dynamics - consisting of these macrolaws
- which could produce a phenomenology indistinguishable (in all important aspects) from
the one that is currently produced by the actual (micro-)dynamics. While the use of such
alternative dynamics constitutes a means of highlighting unexpected (with respect to its
actual dynamics) aspects of its phenomenology (section 5), as discussed in section 3.2, an
unreflective use of these terms harbours the danger of obfuscating the fact that these are
descriptions and labels of phenomenological features.
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3.2.2 Irregularity
There are several complexity definitions that require an embodiment of the criterion of
irregularity (section 4). I use the term ‘irregularity’ as denoting ‘an absence of regularity’
(section 3.2.1). While irregularity is therefore a notion that conceptually contrasts with
the criterion of regularity, the two criteria are not exclusive of each other. In section 4.1, I
will show that some complexity definitions require both criteria to be fulfilled by a system’s
phenomenology to warrant the label ‘complex’ (e.g. by displaying regular and irregular
behaviour simultaneously at di↵erent locations). Other complexity definitions disjunctively
require both phenomenological criteria coupled with di↵erent dynamical criteria, i.e. by
requiring that a complex model either has deterministic dynamics and displays irregular
behaviour or has indeterministic dynamics and displays regular behaviour (section 4.3).
Embodiments of irregularity In contrast to the large number of technical embodiments
of the criterion of aperiodicity used in definitions of chaos (e.g. Zuchowski, 2017; Werndl,
2009; Smith, 1998), definitions of complexity are often based on a simple visual notion
of irregularity, i.e. requiring a disordered appearance (e.g. Wolfram, 2002). Technical
embodiments of the criterion of irregularity are usually based on the notion of statisti-
cal entropy. Reflecting the large number of di↵erent entropy definitions (e.g. Frigg and
Werndl, 2011), there exist several technical realisations of such measures. Entropy measures
based on the minimum length of description (of the phenomenology of a system), e.g. the
Komologorov entropy (e.g. Chaitin, 1966, 1969), directly represent the notion that irreg-
ular regions of a system’s phenomenology lack periodicity and are therefore not amenable
to descriptions that make use of such regularities. However, entropy measures based on
the length of description are usually uncomputable since they must be normalised by use
of a universal language. In order to allow actual computability, other embodiments of the
criterion are based on the assumption that high-phase space entropy, i.e. a uniform spread
of the system’s components’ states through a suitably defined phase-space, is a suitable
embodiment of the criterion of irregularity (Feldman and Crutchfield, 1998, e.g.). Recent
investigations (e.g. Zuchowski, 2012) show that irregular phenomenologies are not the only
ones to which such statistical entropy measures assign high values: for example, the highly-
regular Sierpinski triangle created by the CA90 is also assigned high phase-space entropy
values by many such measures.
Some complexity definitions include criteria that can be viewed as consequences rather
than embodiments of irregularity: in particular, sensitive dependence on initial conditions
(SDIC) has been named as a defining characteristic of complexity (e.g., in the list of defi-
nitions reviewed by Ladyman et al., 2013, p. 12). In chaos theory, where the criterion of
aperiodicity is often more formally defined as an indistinguishability from the phenomenol-
ogy of a Bernoulli process, SDIC is formally entailed by such embodiments of aperiodicity
(e.g. Werndl, 2009). In complexity science, where irregularity is usually embodied more
informally as an absence of regularity, SDIC also appears to be diagnosed informally as the
development of very di↵erent phenomenologies for similar initial conditions. However, likely
due to the lack of formal ties between the concepts, the use of SDIC as an independent
criterion for complexity is relatively rare.
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4 Analysis and comparison of complexity definitions
Having determined the criteria used to define complexity (section 3), I will now move up
to the next layer tier of my analytic framework (section 1.1, Figure 4) and comparatively
analyse several di↵erent complexity definitions: a determinism-based complexity definition
by Wolfram (1984, 2002); an indeterminism-based complexity definition by Ladyman et al.
(2013); and an inclusive complexity definition by Goldenfeld and Kadano↵ (1999). I will
show that each of these complexity definitions can be interpreted as requiring di↵erent com-
binations of di↵erent embodiments of the five criteria for complexity (section 3). Therefore,
this section serves two purposes: (i) that of a comparative analysis of three complexity def-
initions, each of which can be viewed as an example of a class of similar definitions; and (ii)
that of a demonstration of the merits of the tiered framework for the analysis of definitions
(section 1.1) by giving a clear exposition of the structure of complexity definitions.
In section 3.2, I discussed the fact that, in complexity science, distinctions between
the dynamical and phenomenological features of a system are often not strictly upheld
and, in some cases, is blurred by the use of pseudo-dynamical terminology to describe the
latter. Accordingly, identifying the combination of criteria used by a specific definition
can require some interpretative work. Furthermore, not all definitions explicitly identify all
dynamical criteria they seem to be requiring. In these cases, I will reconstruct the dynamical
criteria required from the catalogue of models studied, e.g. if the definition of complexity
is taken to apply to deterministic models only, then this will be counted as requiring the
criterion of determinism. As discussed in section 1, my analysis here is therefore a work of
rational reconstruction: I do not claim that it provides the sole possible approach to the
analysis of complexity definitions but hope that its merits will be amply demonstrated in
the clarity with which their structure is revealed and in its use to derive a minimal definition
of complexity (section 5).
4.1 Wolfram’s determinism-based complexity definition
Wolfram (1984, 2002) provides an indirect definition of complexity through his classification
system for the behaviour of CAs. This system was initial developed to classify the behaviour
of one-dimensional, binary, nearest-neighbour CAs (e.g. Wolfram, 1984). However, it is also
used in Wolfram (2002), which investigates a very large number of di↵erent, deterministic
CAs and is intended as a comprehensive study of complex models (Wolfram, 2002, Chapters
1-3). Accordingly, the classification system, and the implicit definition of complexity it
contains, can be taken to apply generally.
Wolfram (2002, p. 231) describes the four classes of behaviour observed in CA-like
systems in the following way:
In class 1, the behaviour is very simple and almost all initial conditions lead to
exactly the same uniform final state.
In class 2, there are many di↵erent possible final states, but all of them consist
just of a certain set of simple structures that either remain the same forever or
repeat every few steps.
In class 3, the behaviour is more complicated, and seems in many respects ran-
dom, although triangles and other small-scale structures are essentially always
at some level seen.
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... [C]lass 4 involves a mixture of order and randomness; localised structures are
produced which on their own are fairly simple, but these structures move around
and interact with each other in very complicated ways.
Subsequently, class 4 is identified as the class of models that should be labelled ‘complex’
(p. 230): therefore, the description associated with this class implicitly provides a definition
of complexity.
In the remainder of this section, I will show that this definition can be viewed as
requiring three of the five criteria for complexity identified in section 3: determinism (section
3.1.2); regularity (section 3.2.1); and irregularity (section 3.2.2).
Determinism Wolfram (2002, 1984) does not explicitly require determinism as a criterion.
However, the fact that the classification scheme, and therefore the definition of complexity,
is intended to apply only to deterministic models and systems can be deduced from (i) the
choice of models discussed in Wolfram (2002); and (ii) his repeated description of the rule
sets of these models as ‘simple’ (e.g. p. 51).
With respect to aspect (i), it is important to keep in mind that Wolfram (2002)
is intended as a comprehensive review of those systems whose investigation, according to
Wolfram, will constitute ‘a new kind of science’. Accordingly, the fact that all of the models
discussed in Wolfram (2002, Chapters 2-3) are deterministic is a strong indication that
complexity is seen as an exclusive feature of such models, i.e. that determinism is indirectly
required as a criterion.
With respect to aspect (ii), Wolfram (2002, e.g. p. 51) repeatedly describes these
systems and models as having ‘simple’ dynamics. Thereby, ‘simplicity’ implies that the
rule set of a given system can be graphically represented as a transition diagram: namely,
a diagram that assigns to each state of a cell and of those in its neighbourhood unique
states the cells will transition to during the next time step. Assigning a unique state to
each configuration is equivalent to a deterministic description, of course (section 3.1.2).
Consequently, I take Wolfram’s (2002) requirement of ‘simple’ dynamics to constitute an
embodiment of the criterion of determinism. Therefore, I maintain that Wolfram (2002,
1984) definition of complexity requires the criterion of determinism, in the embodiment
of the requirement of underlying processes that can be represented as uniquely defined
transition maps.
Since most of the models in Wolfram (2002) are many-component models, it could be
argued that this criterion (section 3.1.1) should also be viewed as being implicitly required.
However, I maintain that not including this criterion leads to a more truthful reconstruction
of the definition of complexity used by Wolfram (2002) for two reasons: (i) Wolfram’s
catalogue of relevant systems includes models with very few components; (ii) in contrast to
the simplicity of the rule sets, the property of having many components is not highlighted as
an important feature of these systems. Accordingly, I assume that Wolfram’s definition of
complexity does not require the criterion of many components. However, it should be noted
that this decision does not crucially influence any of the arguments made in this paper.
Regularity and irregularity Since the part of the definition of complexity implied by
Wolfram’s classification scheme is a phenomenological one, its requirement of the criteria
of regularity and irregularity are directly apparent in the quotation displayed above. The
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required embodiments of these criteria are the presence of visually recognisable patterns and
the absence of such patterns, respectively. Wolfram has been adamant that the presence
or absence of patterns can easily be detected visually (e.g., while being interviewed by
Gershenson, 2008).
An important aspect of this definition is that these two - prima facie incompatible
- phenomenological criteria are required simultaneously. As apparent in the definition as
quoted above, this can be accomplished by requiring the existence of patterns, i.e. period-
icity, in some spatio-temporal regions of the system’s phenomenology and the absence of
patterns, i.e. aperiodicity, in others. In other words, this definition of complexity requires
deterministic dynamics that lead to both periodic as well as aperiodic behaviour.
It is immediately obvious that the CA110 (section 2.1, Figure 2) can be viewed as
a paradigmatic example of Wolfram’s complexity definition. However, in our set of case
studies, the CA110 is the only model that would be labelled ‘complex’ under this definition:
the Bak-Sneppen model (section 2.2) does not fulfil the criterion of determinism and is
therefore excluded; and the logistic equation’s phenomenology (section 2.3, Figure 4) does
not simultaneously display regular and irregular behaviour (it shows class 3 instead of class
4 behaviour according to Wolfram’s classification scheme) and is therefore also excluded.
4.2 Ladyman’s et al. indeterminism-based complexity definition
Ladyman et al. (2013, p. 57) propose a complexity definition derived from a survey of
existing complexity definition and a subsequent attempt to distil the most important features
of those definitions:
A complex system is an ensemble of many elements which are interacting in a
disordered way, resulting in robust organisation and memory.
In the following, I will show that this definition of complexity requires three of the five
criteria for complexity identified in section 3: the existence of many components (section
3.1.1); indeterminism (section 3.1.3) and regularity (section 3.2.1). In another part of their
paper, Ladyman et al. (2013, Section 3) also discuss which technical embodiments the latter
criterion should assume, namely the requirement of a structural hierarchy.
Existence of many elements It is immediately apparent from the quotation that this
criterion is part of the definition. Ladyman et al. (2013, pp. 57) further specifies that these
elements should be “similar in nature” and describe a number of examples of such systems:
gases with di↵erent molecules; bodies composed of cells; flocks of animals.
Indeterminism While Wolfram (2002) uses the term ‘disordered’ to describe the phe-
nomenology of complex systems, Ladyman et al. (2013, p. 58) use it as a synonym of
indeterminism, i.e. to describe dynamics that do not have unique outcomes for given initial
values and that therefore contain probabilistic elements.1 Their catalogue of examples of
complex systems implies that such dynamics do not need to be random, i.e. equiproba-
ble, but must contain some indeterministic elements. Ladyman et al. (2013, p. 58) also
emphasize that fully deterministic systems are disqualified from being labelled complex:
1This impression was confirmed in personal conversation with Karoline Wiesner during the Physics in
Society workshop at the LMU, Munich, 22-23/7/2016.
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Disorder is a necessary condition for complexity simply because complex systems
are precisely those whose order emerges from disorder rather than being built
into them.
The fact that the definition describes the phenomenological criterion as ‘resulting’
from the two dynamical ones, indicates that Ladyman et al. (2013) assume that these
two criteria will also be part of the su cient conditions for the occurrence of complexity.
(Although, given that not all indeterministic, many-components systems fulfil the criterion
of regularity, these two conditions by themselves cannot constitute the full set of su cient
conditions for the occurrence of complexity.)
Regularity As discussed in section 3.2.1, in complexity science, the terms ‘memory’ and
‘organisation’ are often used as synonyms for temporal and spatial regularity, respectively.
Furthermore, Ladyman et al. (2013, p. 60) make it clear that they view robust organisation
as being hierarchical, i.e. as pattern formation on several scale-levels. The embodiment
of regularity proposed here is therefore that of the existence of a structural hierarchy in a
system’s phenomenology. In an earlier part of their study, Ladyman et al. (2013, section 3)
also discuss the possibility that a requirement of medium phase-space entropy values could
be used as a technical embodiment of the criterion of periodicity. However, their explicit
definition does not directly refer to this embodiment and recent conversations with the
authors (cc. footnote 1) indicate that such entropy measures are no longer seen as suitable
formalisations of this criterion.
It should be noted that only local regularity is required by Ladyman et al. (2013),
i.e. (hierarchical) pattern formation must be evident in a complex system’s phenomenology
but it is not required that the system’s behaviour is regular everywhere. Accordingly,
systems with phenomenologies that are locally regular and locally irregular can also fulfil
the indeterminism-based complexity definition. However, local irregularity is not required:
systems that are fully regular but fulfil the dynamical criteria outlined above would therefore
also judged to be complex.
From this analysis, it is immediately obvious that the complexity definition by Lady-
man et al. (2013) di↵ers significantly from the determinism-based complexity definition by
Wolfram (2002). Besides explicitly requiring the criterion of the existence of many elements,
their definition requires a combination of indeterministic dynamics and regular behaviour. In
contrast, Wolfram (2002) requires a combination of deterministic dynamics with behaviour
that is both regular and irregular. Since the dynamical criteria of determinism and indeter-
minism are exclusive of one another, the two complexity definitions are likewise exclusive,
i.e. their extensions do not overlap and no system will be classified as being complex by
both definitions.
The exclusivity of the two definitions can be illustrated through the classification of
our case studies: the CA110 (section 2.1), which is complex according to Wolfram’s definition
(section 4.1), does not fulfil the criterion of indeterminism and is therefore not complex
according to Ladyman’s et al. complexity definition. Similarly, the Bak-Sneppen model
(section 2.2), which could be seen as a paradigmatic case for Ladyman’s et al. indeterministic
definition, is not complex according to Wolfram’s deterministic definition (section 4.1). The
third model in our set of case studies, the logistic equation (section 2.3), is excluded from the
extension of the indeterministic complexity definition by failing to meet two of its criteria:
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it is neither deterministic nor does its phenomenology show any kind of regularity.
4.3 Goldenfeld & Kadano↵ ’s inclusive complexity definition
The definition of complexity given by Goldenfeld and Kadano↵ (1999, p. 87) is very simple:
To us, complexity means that we have structure with variation.
Of course, this definition by itself is too short to be analysable. However, the accompanying
article discusses several examples of systems that possess “structure with variation” from
which a tighter notion of the content of this definition can be constructed:
• Chaotic systems: Systems which obey “simple” (e.g. p. 87) – deterministic – laws,
i.e. have structured dynamics, and have irregular phenomenologies, i.e. have variable
phenomenologies.
• Spin-glass type systems: Systems with many components that obey simple, determin-
istic laws, i.e. have structured dynamics, and have phenomenologies that are both
regular and irregular, i.e. have some element of variation in their phenomenology.
• Fluid systems with di↵usion: Systems with many component that obey indeterministic
laws, i.e. have varied dynamics, and have phenomenologies that are both regular and
irregular, i.e. have some element of structure in their phenomenology.
Accordingly, the definition by Goldenfeld and Kadano↵ (1999) seems to roughly
equate ‘structure’ with either the criterion of determinism or of regularity and to equate
‘variation’ with either the criterion of indeterminism or of irregularity. Under this interpre-
tation, only systems that have structured dynamics and varied behaviour, i.e. that have
deterministic dynamics and (at least locally) aperiodic behaviour, or that have varied dy-
namics and structured behaviour, i.e. that have indeterministic dynamics and (at least
locally) periodic behaviour should be included in the definition’s extension. This definition
is therefore based on four of the five criteria for complexity identified in section 3: determin-
ism (section 3.1.2); indeterminism (section 3.1.3); regularity (section 3.2.1) and irregularity
(section 3.2.2). However, the definition only requires the fulfilment of one of two distinct
combinations of these criteria: either of (i) determinism coupled with irregularity; or of (ii)
indeterminism coupled with regularity.
Goldenfeld and Kadano↵ (1999, pp. 88-89) do not specify any specific embodiments
for these criteria. Instead, their discussion indicates that the choice of precise embodiment
for each criterion should be system-specific: e.g. typical measures of stochasticity as em-
bodiments of irregularity in chaotic systems; visual identification of irregularity in spin-type
systems; statistical power-laws as embodiments of regularity in fluid systems with di↵usion.
Goldenfeld & Kadano↵’s (1999) definition is the most inclusive of the three definitions
discussed here. In particular, its extension contains chaotic systems, which fulfil combina-
tion (i) of the required criteria. All systems that are diagnosed as complex according to
the determinism-based complexity definition (section 4.1) will also fulfil this combination
of criteria and will therefore also be included. Likewise, all systems that are diagnosed
as complex according to the indeterminism-based complexity definition (section 4.2) fulfil
combination (ii) of the criteria for complexity and are therefore also included.
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Table 1: Combinations of criteria required by three prevalent complexity definitions (section
4). For the inclusive definition, the two possible combinations are superscribed (i) and (ii),
as defined in section 4.3.
Deterministic Indeterministic Inclusive
definition definition definition
Many components X
Determinism X X(i)
Indeterminism X X(ii)
Regularity X X X(ii)
Irregularity X X(i)
The inclusivity of Goldenfeld & Kadano↵’s definition can be illustrated through the
classification of our three case studies (section 2): all three models will be classified as
complex according to this definition. In particular, the CA110 (section 2.1) and the logistic
equation (section 2.3) both fulfil combination (i) of the required criteria, while the Bak-
Sneppen model (section 2.2) fulfils combination (ii).
5 A minimal definition of complexity
In this section, I will use the results of my analysis of the three complexity definitions (section
4) to show that all three definitions require contrasting dynamical and phenomenological
criteria: namely, they require either combinations of criteria that pair determinism with
irregularity or indeterminism with regularity. From this, I will derive a minimal definition
of complexity, i.e. a description of the concept that underlies all of these definitions (section
1.1).
In section 5.2, I will argue that this contrast between the dynamics and the phe-
nomenology of a system, i.e. the concept behind all complexity definitions, can be inter-
preted as a type of epistemological emergence. I will therefore argue that it is possible
to (minimally) define complexity as a type of emergence, but that the kind of emergence
associated with complex systems is a relatively weak one.
5.1 Dynamics-phenomenology contrasts as the conceptual heart of
complexity science
As discussed in section 4, each of the three analysed complexity definitions requires di↵erent
combinations of the five criteria for complexity. These combination are displayed compara-
tively in Table 1. The table illustrates some of the results already discussed in section 4: the
determinism-based and indeterminism-based definition, which require exclusive dynamical
criteria, have non-overlapping extension; the extension of the inclusive definition includes
the extensions of the deterministic and indeterministic definition. In addition, the inclusive
definition is the only definition whose extension includes chaotic systems. These systems
will be excluded from the indeterminism-based definition through the requirement of the
dynamical criteria of the existence of many components and of indeterminism. Chaotic
systems will generally also be excluded from the determinism-based complexity definition
through the requirement of two phenomenological criteria to occur simultaneously: while
chaotic systems may have periodic and aperiodic phases parameter regimes, these properties
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are not displayed simultaneously in the phenomenology of a model.
Since the determinism-based and indeterminism-based complexity definition have
non-overlapping extension, one can easily find systems that will be diagnosed as being com-
plex according to one definition but not according to the other. For example, the CA110
(section 2.1) is complex according to Wolfram’s determinism-based definition but not ac-
cording to Ladyman’s et al. indeterminism-based definition (section 4.2); the Bak-Sneppen
model (section 2.2) is complex according to the indeterminism-based definition but not ac-
cording to the determinism-based one. Prima facie it might therefore appear impossible to
identify a unifying concept behind these di↵erent definitions. Attempts to do so have usually
relied on a metaphorical approach: the concept of complexity is supposed to be captured
by a unifying slogan. In the following, I will review the two most prominent metaphorical
descriptions of the concept of complexity and will show that they are best interpreted as
restatements of particular complexity definitions. As such, I think that this approach to
finding a minimal definition of complexity is not a promising one. Rather, these metaphor-
ical definitions should be interpreted as highlighting aspects of each definition that can be
used to define the concept of complexity in a more technically throughout way.
Interpretation of metaphorical descriptions of the concept of complexity The
analysis and comparison of di↵erent complexity definitions (section 4) can help to make more
precise some notorious metaphorical descriptions of the concept of complexity: namely, the
notions of complexity being located between chaos and order and of self-organisation. Each
of these terms has been criticised for being overly metaphorical and for not being applicable
to a number of well-known complex models (e.g. Frigg, 2003; Zuchowski, 2012). However,
viewed in the context of the coexistence of two exclusive complexity definitions, one can
assign clearer meanings to these terms. Namely: the notion of complexity as being concep-
tually located between chaos and order appears to capture the simultaneous requirement
of the two phenomenological criteria of regularity and irregularity in combination with the
requirement of the dynamical criterion of determinism in the determinism-based definition;
the notion of self-organisation appears to describe the requirement of the phenomenological
criterion of periodicity in combination with the dynamical criterion of indeterminism in the
indeterminism-based definition.
The determinism-based definition of complexity requires the phenomenology of com-
plex systems to display both irregular and regular features; due to the fact that the criterion
of determinism is also required, the irregular parts of this phenomenology could be labelled
chaotic in the sense of some chaos definitions (e.g. Smith, 1998; Zuchowski, 2017). If it is
taken to describe the coexistence of regular and irregular dynamics in deterministic (albeit
possibly many-component) systems, then the metaphor of complexity being located between
chaos and order acquires a sharper conceptual meaning. However, the making more precise
of this concept also entails a new exclusivity. In particular, none of the models in the ex-
tension of the indeterminism-based definition of complexity fall under this description since
(by definition) they lack the deterministic dynamics necessary for the diagnosis of chaos.
Of those models to which the inclusive definition of complexity applies, only those that
fulfil combination (i) of the required criteria, i.e. which fulfil the dynamical criterion of
determinism and the phenomenological criterion of irregularity, and that additional show
regular phenomenological features (which are not required by the inclusive definition), could
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be described as being located ‘between order and chaos’. Therefore, under this interpre-
tation, the metaphor becomes a rephrasing of one particular complexity definition – the
determinism-based one – only. In the set of our three case studies (section 2), only the
CA110 would be covered by the metaphor.
The indeterminism-based definition of complexity requires indeterministic dynamics
in combination with phenomenologies that show regular features. In section 3.2.1, I discussed
the fact that the term ‘organisation’ is often used as paraphrasing of regularity, in particular,
in relation to the embodiment of the criterion as the existence of a structural hierarchy. If
the term ‘self-organisation’ is taken to describe precisely this combination of features, i.e.
the existence of indeterministic dynamics and regular phenomenological features, then its
conceptual content is well-defined. However, this new conceptual precision again comes
with a new level exclusivity: none of the models in the extension of the determinism-based
complexity definition, which lack the required indeterministic dynamics, could then be called
self-organised. Furthermore, of those models that are complex according to the inclusive
definition, only models that fulfil combination (ii) of the required criteria, i.e. those that fulfil
the dynamical criterion of indeterminism and the phenomenological criterion of regularity,
should be described as self-organised. In the set of our three case studies (section 2), only
the Bak-Sneppen model would be covered by the metaphor.
Arguably the most surprising result of this analysis is the fact that the concepts
of ‘being located between order and chaos’ and of ‘self-organisation’ – if their conceptual
content is sharpened to move them beyond the mere metaphorical level – are exclusive
of each other. That is: since these concepts appear to be encapsulations of the particular
combinations of criteria required by two di↵erent definitions of complexity, whose extensions
do not overlap, no system can be both located between order and chaos as well as be self-
organised. I therefore maintain that they are not suitable to serve as descriptions of the
concept of complexity, which (according to analytic framework underlying my analysis,
section 1.1, should ideally be reflected in all associated definitions. However, I will now
argue that these metaphors highlight a shared feature of these definitions that can be used
for a minimal definition of complexity.
Dynamics-phenomenology contrasts as the conceptual heart of complexity As
outlined by Zuchowski (2017, Chapter 3), the co-existence of several, partly exclusive def-
initions and concepts in a scientific field is not necessarily a sign of nefarious conceptual
divides. Rather, it can be interpreted as a useful means of highlighting the particular fea-
tures of a particular class of systems that are most interesting to researchers in that field. If
the two concepts of ‘being between order and chaos’ and ‘self-organisation’ are interpreted
as such means of highlighting interesting features, a feature characteristic of both concepts
becomes apparent: they both highlight a contrast between the dynamics of a system and
its phenomenology.
Underlying the assumption that indeterministic dynamics contrast with regular phe-
nomenological features and that deterministic dynamics contrast with irregular phenomeno-
logical features, is - of course - a baseline expectation that deterministic dynamics lead to
regular behaviour and that indeterministic dynamics lead to irregular behaviour. That this
expectation is (or used to be until the advent of complexity science) mainstream among
scientists is frequently stressed by complexity scientists (and by chaos scientists, e.g. May,
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1976, p. 459). For example, Wolfram (2002, pp. 39-40) writes:
Yet at first this [the behaviour of (deterministically) complex CAs] may seem
almost impossible to believe. For it goes against some of our most basic intuitions
about the way things normally work. For our everyday experience leads us to
believe that an object that looks complicated must have been constructed in a
complicated way.
All of the complexity definitions discussed in section 4, and the two prominent metaphorical
descriptions analysed here, highlight this precise contrast between existing intuitions about
the phenomenologies of systems with particular dynamics and their actual phenomenologies.
Using the terminology that I have introduced here, all of them therefore formalise a specific
version of this contrast between the dynamics and the phenomenologies of the specific class
of systems in their respective extensions. Accordingly, I maintain that this contrast between
the dynamics of a model and its phenomenology, judged against mainstream intuitions about
the relationship between these two parts of a model, appears to constitute the conceptual
heart of complexity science. It can therefore serve as a minimal definition of the concept
of complexity: complexity describes a contrast between the degree of determinism of the
dynamics and the regularity/irregularity of the phenomenology of a system. Interpreted in
this light, the di↵erent complexity definitions, and the metaphorical descriptions associated
with them, can be viewed as means to identify and to highlight such contrasts in di↵erent
classes of systems, i.e. as means of making this general concept applicable to specific classes
of systems.
5.2 Dynamics-phenomenology contrasts as epistemological emer-
gence
In section 5.1, I identified the existence of a contrast between the (expectations about) the
dynamics of a system and its phenomenology as the core concept behind the label ‘complex’.
It is easy to see that this contrast can also be interpreted as a kind of epistemological emer-
gence (section 5.2). As a matter of fact, the quotation by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948,
p. 147) displayed above, describes emergence as precisely the disappointment of reasonable
expectations about the behaviour of a system based on knowledge about the system’s com-
ponents. In my terminology, this definition of emergence maps onto the requirement of a
contrast between the expectations formed from the known dynamics of a system and its
actual phenomenology. Given that this contrast is grounded in the intuitions that scientists
have formed from their previous work with models and systems, i.e. the expectation that
deterministic dynamics lead to regular phenomenologies and that indeterministic dynamics
lead to irregular phenomenologies, this notion of emergence is clearly an epistemological
one.
The fact that the core concept behind di↵erent definitions of complexity can be viewed
as a kind of emergence explains why various versions of this latter notion have been associ-
ated with complexity (e.g. Holland, 1998; Kau↵man, 1995; Davies, 2003; Kau↵man, 2008).
The di↵erent complexity definitions surveyed in section 4 can be interpreted as articula-
tions of this kind of emergence for di↵erent classes of models. As a kind of epistemological
emergence, ‘complex emergence’ appears to be unique in its focus on irregular behaviour
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emerging from deterministic dynamics or regular behaviour emerging from indeterministic
dynamics.
The fact that the type of emergence that is associated with the concept of complexity
is epistemological in nature does not mean that it is ‘trivial’ or ‘uninteresting’. While my
analysis doe not bear out inflationary claims about the importance of complex emergence
in nature (e.g. Morowitz, 2002; Gregersen, 2003), it does support the view that complexity
is a concept used to highlight a class of systems that needs new investigative approaches
(e.g., as advocated by Wolfram, 2002; Kau↵man, 2008). In particular, new technical tools
are needed to extrapolated from the (observed) phenomenology of these systems to their
underlying dynamics; the case of chaos theory – which under this minimal definition would
indeed be an exploration of the same concept in a particular manifestation, namely for
systems with few components - shows that the development of such techniques is both
fruitful as well as technically demanding (e.g. Zuchowski, 2017, Chapter 4).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I analysed the use of phenomenological and dynamical criteria in di↵erent
complexity definitions (sections 3 and 4) and used this analysis to provide a minimal defini-
tion for the concept underlying all of these definition (section 5.1). Thereby, I used a tiered
analytical framework (section 1.1, Figure 1) that distinguishes between a general concept,
which can be defined through a minimal definition; di↵erent definitions associated with this
concept; criteria that are used in these definitions; and technical embodiments of these cri-
teria. My results were illustrated on three well-known models in complexity science (section
2): the CA110 (section 2.1); the Bak-Sneppen model (section 2.2); and the logistic equation
(section 2.3).
In section 3, I identified five core criteria for the diagnosis of complexity: three dy-
namical criteria (section 3.1) and three phenomenological criteria (section 3.2). The three
dynamical criteria are the existence of many components (section 3.1.1); determinism (sec-
tion 3.1.2); and indeterminism (section 3.1.3). The two latter criteria thereby require the
dynamics of a system to either allow only one unique development from a given initial value
or to allow di↵erent developments from a given initial value, i.e. to contain probabilistic
elements, respectively. The two phenomenological criteria for complexity are regularity (sec-
tion 3.2.1) and irregularity (section 3.2.2). Embodiments of regularity are usually measures
of the number of patterns identifiable in a system’s behaviour while embodiments of irreg-
ularity can either be measures of the absence of regularity or measures that encapsulate
similarities of the system’s phenomenology with that of a truly stochastic system.
I then analysed the use of these criteria in three di↵erent complexity definitions:
Wolfram’s determinism-based complexity definition (section 4.1); Ladyman’s et al. inde-
terminism based complexity definition (section 4.2); and Goldenfeld & Kadano↵’s inclusive
complexity definition (section 4.3). Each of these definitions can be seen as an example of a
class of similar definitions. I showed that each definition can be interpreted as requiring dif-
ferent combinations of di↵erent embodiments of the five criteria for complexity (Table 1). In
particular, the determinism-based definition requires the dynamical criterion of determinism
and the simultaneous fulfilment of the phenomenological criteria of regularity and irregu-
larity. The indeterminism-based definition requires the dynamical criteria of the existence
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of many components and of indeterminism. Due to the fact that they require dynamical
criteria that are exclusive of another, the determinism- and indeterminism-based definitions
are mutually exclusive, i.e. systems that fulfil the criteria of one of these definitions cannot
fulfil the criteria of the other one. Among the three case studies considered, only the CA110
fulfilled the criteria of the determinism-based definition and only the Bak-Sneppen model
fulfilled those of the indeterminism-based complexity definition. Both definitions exclude
chaotic systems from also being labelled complex: the determinism-based definition does so
by requiring the phenomenological criterion of regularity while the indeterminism-based def-
inition does so by requiring the dynamical criterion of indeterminism. The logistic equation
is therefore not labelled as complex by either the determinism- or the indeterminism-based
complexity definition.
The third complexity definition analysed here, the inclusive complexity definition,
possesses an extension that includes the extensions of the determinism- and indeterminism
based definition. It also includes chaotic systems. This is achieved by requiring the fulfilment
of one of two possible combinations of criteria: either the dynamical criterion of determinism
coupled with the phenomenological criterion of irregularity; or the dynamical criterion of
indeterminism coupled with the phenomenological criterion of regularity. The disjunctive
nature of this definition makes it applicable to a wide range of systems. In particular, all
three of the case studies are complex according to this definition.
Finally, I used the results from my analysis of di↵erent complexity definitions to
shed light on the general concept of complexity and to provide a minimal definition of
this concept. In section 5.1, I showed that the three complexity definitions discussed all
share one feature: they all require the existence of a contrast between the classified sys-
tems’ dynamics and phenomenology. This is achieved by requiring combinations of the
dynamical and phenomenological criteria that defy mainstream expectations about how
these criteria should be related, i.e. by pairing the criterion of determinism with that of
irregularity and that of indeterminism with that of regularity. I also showed that two preva-
lent metaphorical descriptions in complexity science, ‘being between order and chaos’ and
‘self-organisation’, could be mode more precise if interpreted as descriptions of two such
dynamics-phenomenology contrasts, namely the ones associated with the determinism- and
indeterminism-based definitions, respectively. However, as they conceptualise only specific
dynamics-phenomenology contrasts, these metaphorical descriptions are not general enough
to serve as minimal definitions of complexity. Instead, I proposed the following minimal
definition for complexity: a contrast between the degree of determinism of the dynamics of
a system and the regularity/irregularity of its phenomenology.
In section 5.2, I argued that the dynamics-phenomenology contrast that underlies all
complexity definitions and defines the concept of complexity constitutes a kind of epistemo-
logical emergence. It would therefore be possible to use this framework to define ‘complex
emergence’ as the emergence of phenomenological features that defy our expectations (de-
rived from knowledge about a given system’s dynamics) about the phenomenology of this
system. In particular, complex emergence describes the emergence of irregular features in
the behaviour of deterministic systems and the emergence of regular features in the be-
haviour of indeterministic systems.
The fact that these particular combinations of dynamical and phenomenological fea-
tures are perceived as contrasting or emergent might raise questions about the anthro-
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pocentric nature of the concept of complexity, which appears to be deeply entwined with
our expectations about which dynamics should lead to which behaviour. However, such
questions are raised by the very notion of epistemological emergence and their discussion
exceeds the scope of this paper.
I hope that my analysis has clearly shown that these dynamics-phenomenology con-
trasts form the conceptual heart of complexity science. Under this interpretation, the
determinism- and indeterminism-based definition are viewed as di↵erent articulations of
this core concept for di↵erent classes of models. Accordingly, I view these two definitions
not as rivals for the one true definition of complexity but as complementary expressions of
one single concepts. By allowing the articulation of di↵erent but, equally relevant, kinds of
dynamics- and phenomenology contrasts, their coexistence appears to be epistemically use-
ful rather than divisive. In this sense, complexity science appears to be similar to other fields
of science (e.g. as discussed in section 1.1, chaos theory; the study of social interactions;
climate science) in which the need to combine di↵erent models, techniques and methods
renders the coexistence of several definitions of the field’s core concepts expedient.
I also suggested that dynamics-phenomenology contrasts should be seen as the defin-
ing feature of complexity science; a feature that is reflected in di↵erent form in all complexity
definitions and in the most prominent metaphorical descriptors of the field. In this context,
it is useful to question whether inclusive definitions, like the one discussed in section 4.3,
might not be too inclusive. In particular, I think there is some merit in avoiding the in-
clusion of chaotic systems into the extensions of complexity definitions. My argument for
this recommendation is not based on any conceptual qualms with this definition, which
is a valid articulation of the concept of complexity as minimally defined above, but on a
methodological worry. While some definitions of chaos require deterministic dynamics and
irregular phenomenologies, there are also chaos definitions which are not articulations of
such a dynamics-phenomenology contrast (e.g. Zuchowski, 2017; Smith, 1998). Further-
more, the methodology of chaos theory is distinct from that of the investigation associated
with models covered by the determinism- and indeterminism-based complexity definition:
the methods used to investigate this one particular kind of contrast and other kinds of
chaos appear to be of little direct use for the investigation of the systems targeted by the
determinism- or indeterminism based definition. Accordingly, a desire for maximum concep-
tual clarity and epistemic usefulness should dictate that any complexity definition avoids the
unnecessary inclusion of already categorised systems and focuses on identifying systems that
feature novel types of dynamics-phenomenology contrasts, e.g. as done by the determinism-
and indeterminism-based definition. As discussed in section 3.1.1, an easy way o↵ exclud-
ing the majority of chaotic systems, including the logistic equation used as a case study
in this paper, is to universally require the criterion of the existence of many components.
Accordingly, a somewhat stricter minimal definition for complexity might be entertained,
which defines complexity as the existence of dynamics-phenomenology contrasts in systems
with many elements. As argued above, I think that such a stricter minimal definition has
methodological advantages but would still maintain that conceptually the most important
defining feature of complexity are dynamics-phenomenology contrasts.
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